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17 March 1995

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Fiftieth session
Item 109 of the preliminary list*

ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

Letter dated 16 March 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information on women's health in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and sanctions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 109 of the provisional list, and brought to the attention of the Commission on the Status of Women at its thirty-ninth session.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/50/50.

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ANNEX

Women's health in Yugoslavia and sanctions

International cooperation in the field of health is aimed at providing better living conditions for men and women regardless of social system and class affiliation, ensuring humane relations between nations, respect for human rights and accessibility of medical science, medical aid and its achievements to people all over the world.

Never before has a physician's work been more burdened with ethical problems and dilemmas as it is under the sanctions, imposing a blockade in all spheres of life.

The sanctions against Yugoslavia are reflected most painfully and most tragically in the field of health care. The sanctions have brought about an increase in the mortality rate from 3.5 per cent to 4.6 per cent and in the following diseases:

- infections in general;

- postoperative complications (sepsis, bronchial pneumonia, peritonitis, etc.);

- contagious diseases; in the period 1989-1993, the number of those who died from contagious diseases increased by 141 per cent;

- gastro-intestinal diseases, complications after abdominal operations, etc.;

- complications caused by insufficiently and inadequately treated diabetes and arterial hypertension;

- cardiovascular diseases; because of stress situations, myocardial infarctions now occur at the younger average age of 57, instead of 61 as in the past. It is not possible to prevent an increase in the number of patients suffering from myocardial infarctions because of the chronic shortages of drugs. The number of open-heart operations has been halved. Because of chronic stress, the number of patients suffering from arterial hypertension is increasing. The shortage of antibiotics has resulted in frequent infective endocarditis. Cases of rheumatic fever are registered ever more frequently. In Kosovo and Metohija alone, 1,000 new cases were recorded annually in the period 1991-1993, with the mortality rate of 10 per cent. This previously eradicated disease in Yugoslavia will bring about new cases of mitral stenosis and other acquired heart defects;

- tuberculosis is in the ascendant and the full scope of the disease will manifest itself only later. This is explained by the fall in the standard of living, inadequate diet, lack of vaccinations and cases imported by refugees;

- miscarriages and abortions, risky pregnancies and stillborn babies, accounting for the fall in the birth rate;

- perinatal morbidity is reflected in an increased number of cases of genetic heart defects and defects of other organs;

- malnutrition and anaemia because of inadequate diet, which affects pregnant women and nursing mothers in particular;

- alcoholism;

- sexual diseases and AIDS;

- psychosomatic diseases;

- anxiety and reactive deviations in behaviour;

- psychotraumas, including the cases of raped men and women refugees who found shelter in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

- depressive states;

- mange and lice infection;

- the mortality rate among persons suffering from malignant diseases has increased because of the lack of cytostatics.

The said diseases have affected in particular the most vulnerable categories of the population: children, women and the old.

In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the health protection service for women provides out-patient health care for women over 15 years of age. In 1993, it had 399 units, 6.6 per cent less than in 1992 when there were 427 units.

In 1993, 1,689 health workers, 599 physicians and 1,090 nurses and other workers provided health care. Compared to 1992, when there were 803 physicians, this number has been reduced by 0.7 per cent. Of the overall number of physicians, 521 were specialists, 69 were enrolled in specialization courses and 9 were general practitioners.

In 1993, the overall number of visits to physicians stood at 3,123,000, 10.7 per cent less than in 1986 (4,823,000).

In the period 1992-1993, the number of visits by pregnant women to medical centres fell from 153,000 in 1992 to 131,000 in 1993, or by 14.4 per cent.

In the same period, the number of visits to family planning centres fell from 124,000 in 1992 to 94,000 in 1993, or by 24.4 per cent. Compared to 1986 (191,000), it fell by 50.8 per cent. This means that in 1993 only 10 per cent of women capable of having children were covered by the work of family planning centres.

According to the analysis available at the Federal Health Protection Administration, the health protection service for women has identified 970,000 diseases, conditions and injuries, or 6.5 per cent of the overall number of diseases, conditions and injuries. The following five most frequent groups of diseases, conditions and injuries of women have been identified:

1. Genito-urinary system diseases - 727,110 (74.9 per cent);

2. Complications during pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium - 116,446 (12 per cent);

3. Infective and parasitic diseases - 79,534 (8.2 per cent);

4. Neoplasm - 26,109 (2.7 per cent);

5. Endocrinal diseases, dietary, metabolism and immunity diseases - 16,479 (1.7 per cent).

The said diseases are a direct consequence of irregular medical examination and treatment of women (reduced coverage and preventive and curative examinations in out-patient medical centres), shortage of medicine, shorter hospitalization, reduced possibilities for timely laboratory, X-ray and other diagnosis under the sanctions.

Of particular concern is an increase in the number of diseases and conditions related to complications during pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium. One of the most tragic consequences of these diseases is an increase of the infant mortality rate from 41.3 per cent in 1990 to 49.3 per cent in 1992. Furthermore, the data from all gynaecological and obstetric centres in Yugoslavia indicate that an ever greater number of pregnant women are threatened by miscarriage, anaemia, premature childbirth (in 1993, the number of prematurely born children increased by 8.45 per cent compared to 7 per cent in the previous period), foetus defects, Caesarian section (in the period before the sanctions, Caesarian section accounted for between 7 per cent and 8.2 per cent of births, while in 1992 that percentage stood at 10.6), etc.

The preventive early diagnosis of breast and genital malignant diseases of women has been reduced while the mortality rate of women suffering from neoplasm has increased. The higher mortality rate among women is explained by the increase in breast cancer, occurring primarily because of the chronic shortage of spare parts for diagnostic and therapeutic instruments and the lack of medicine (cytostatics, analgesics, antibiotics). In the period between May 1992 and June 1993, over 2,600 women patients died of cancer.

The problem of miscarriage is of great social and medical importance for the health of women. The number of miscarriages has increased because of stress. Furthermore, the number of abortions is also great (145,000 in 1993) because of insufficient financial means. Even more tragic is the fact that the number of illegal abortions has increased for the first time, because an ever smaller number of women can afford the abortion costs in legal medical institutions. Illegal abortions affect the health situation of women and reduce

their reproductive functions. Thus, the fertility rate of women - 3.37 per cent in 1980 - fell to 2.08 per cent in 1992.

In addition to the said five groups of diseases, AIDS is on the increase among women in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, caused by the social and economic situation, population migrations, increase in drug addiction, alcoholism, prostitution, shortage of specific prevention items and effective drugs.

By imposing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the field of health, the international community has trampled upon the best traditions of medicine and the provisions of international humanitarian law, particularly the 1989 World Health Organization resolution explicitly prohibiting the embargo on medical supplies for political reasons.

The sanctions will be lifted one day, but they will inevitably leave visible traces on, and have disastrous long-term consequences for, the health of people, women and children in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In view of the importance of the rights of women, particularly to life and health, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the issue of the disastrous effects of sanctions on the position of women, not only in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but also in other countries affected by sanctions, should be reflected in the forthcoming preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women within the Commission on the Status of Women as well as at the Conference itself. The Commission on the Status of Women should decide that violations of basic rights and freedoms of women, provided for by international human rights instruments, by the imposition of sanctions for narrow political reasons are unacceptable. Sanctions also constitute an outright threat to the exercise of the rights provided for by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 92 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 17 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit herewith the text of a statement by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, made at Copenhagen on 12 March 1995, concerning the possibility of a new international presence in Croatia after the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on 31 March 1995 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would distribute the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under item 92 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Dr. Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

* A/50/50.

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Annex

Statement made at Copenhagen on 12 March 1995
by the President of Croatia

As at 1 April 1995, the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia will have expired. Working with the United Nations Security Council and its partners in the international community, Croatia will seek to negotiate a new Security Council mandate for an international presence in Croatia that will:

(a) Control the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at such places where principal crossing points are not now controlled by the authorities of the Republic of Croatia;

(b) Control access and communications for UNPROFOR and other international humanitarian operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina through territory not currently under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia; and

(c) Facilitate the continued implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 and the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994, the implementation of future agreements aimed at the reintegration of Croatia and the implementation of relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

Pending the successful negotiation of a mandate for a new international presence along the lines described above and for a limited period of time, the Government of Croatia agrees that the current international presence may continue to perform functions related to its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and functions essential to the continued implementation of the above-mentioned agreements of 29 March 1994 and 2 December 1994.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 147 of the preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS
WITH THE HOST COUNTRY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 17 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to the letters which I sent to you on 11 September 1994 (A/49/377-S/1994/1047), 23 October 1994 (A/49/569-S/1994/1210) and 28 November 1994 (A/49/723-S/1994/1362), I have the honour to inform you that the competent authorities of the United States of America have again failed to assume their obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, by refusing to grant an entry visa to an Iraqi official who was supposed to participate in United Nations activities.

On 1 February 1995, the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations submitted to the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations an application for an entry visa for Mr. Barzan Ibrahim Al-Tikriti, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva, so as to enable him to be a member of the high-level Iraqi delegation to the Security Council headed by Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Council's periodic consideration, on 13 March 1995, of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. Unfortunately, the competent United States authorities did not grant the entry visa to the Iraqi official, and failed to justify the denial.

This continuing practice by the United States of America, which is unwarranted and contrary to its legal and moral obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, the Charter of the United Nations and international custom, points to a serious shortcoming that must be eliminated and corrected by all possible means.

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* A/50/50.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 147 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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20 March 1995

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Fiftieth session
Items 99 and 120 of the
preliminary list*

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

JOINT INSPECTION UNIT

National execution of projects

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "National execution of projects" (JIU/REP/94/9).

* A/50/50.

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ANNEX

JIU/REP/94/9

[ORIGINAL: ARABIC, CHINESE, ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH]

NATIONAL EXECUTION OF PROJECTS

Prepared by
Tunsala Kabongo

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva
1994

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ORGANIZATIONS

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

INSTITUTIONS

ACC	Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
AOS	Administrative and Operational Services
CCPOQ	Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions
GCCC	Government Cash Counterpart Contribution
IPF	Indicative Planning Figure
NEX	National execution of projects
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPD	National Project Director
OPS	Office for Project Services
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TPC	Technical Project Chief
TSS	Technical Support Services

Bibliographic references

General Assembly	Resolution 47/199 Resolution 44/211 Resolution 32/197
UNDP Governing Council	Decision 92/22 Decision 90/34 Decision 90/26 Decision 90/21
UNDP	Guidelines for Programme Support Document (PSD), November 1983
UNDP	Programme and Projects Manual (PPM), Revision 0, May 1991
UNDP Guidelines	Determination of Execution and Implementation Arrangements; Successor Arrangements for Agency Support Costs, Revision 1, October 1992
JIU/REP/78/3	Report on the Role of Experts in Development Cooperation, Geneva, 1978
No author	UNDP Study on Government Execution, Report of mission to Asia, November 1981 Guidelines for National Execution of UNDP-Assisted Projects in India (IET 8580), New Delhi, March 1992 Evaluation Bulletin, Bulletin No. 4, autumn 1993 Inter-Agency Informal Consultations on Programme-Approach and National Execution, Turin, ITC, ILO, 24-28 April 1994

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

1. Summary

Although the principle of national execution of projects is largely accepted in theory, a certain amount of resistance is still encountered when putting it into practice. This resistance includes:

(a) That of donors, who, in view of the recipient countries' lack of experience and the inadequacy of their management capacity, are wary of injudicious use of the funds allocated to national programmes and projects;

(b) Reluctance also on the part of the specialized agencies, which consider that countries do not have the necessary capacity to execute the projects concerned;

(c) Lack of confidence on the part of the countries concerned in their national experts; and lastly

(d) Lack of interest on the part of international experts, in view of the unattractive conditions offered by countries.

Levels of national execution of projects vary according to the country, Government and region concerned. In this respect several factors bear consideration:

(a) The capacity of the Government, and the competence and authority of senior officials in ministries and national institutions;

(b) The attitude of UNDP: the instructions from headquarters to Resident Representatives in each country;

(c) The competence and personality of the Resident Representative;

(d) The participation of the specialized agencies as and when they become involved in the country's framework-programme;

(e) The nature of the project (study or technical);

(f) The quality and degree of cooperation between the partners: Governments and other national institutions, UNDP, specialized agencies and NGOs;

(g) The degree of transparency and effectiveness in the choice of executing agent and implementation of the project.

Certain dysfunctions have been noted in some places, showing that, in the context of the national execution of programmes and projects, all the partners do not yet have the same understanding:

(a) Of the definition - precise and acceptable to all - of the concept of national execution of programmes and projects;

(b) Of their roles and their relations with the other players, in particular at the programming, implementation and management levels.

Since this dysfunctioning is in the long term liable to disrupt the attainment of the objectives of national execution of projects, it cannot be too strongly recommended that stress should be laid both on clarification and simplification of the new rules concerning project execution, and on the training of decision makers and senior personnel in the developing countries at the three levels mentioned above.

2. Principal findings

The flow of information between the headquarters of system organizations (UNDP, specialized agencies) and recipient countries leaves something to be desired. Communication by telephone is often extremely difficult between these two categories of partners, and getting mail to the countries concerned is slow, and sometimes impossible. Given this situation, use of new information technologies accessible to the countries concerned, such as CD-ROM and video, may be recommended. UNESCO is helping to strengthen intersectoral programmes, notably through the libraries at information centres, secondary schools, colleges and universities. It could, in conjunction with other organizations, contribute at least partially to the solution of these communication difficulties.

This sluggishness in the flow of information may in some cases be attributed to cumbersome government bureaucracy. There is, in fact, a very long lapse of time between requests, notably for administrative authorizations by the agencies, 1/ and the Government's reply, and there are considerable delays by Governments in the delivery of their cash counterpart contributions.

Some Governments sometimes put strong pressure both on national staff assigned to projects and on technical staff (international experts), and do not always respect specialized agencies' technical opinions. This has in many cases led, inter alia, to a reduction in international consultants' working time in the country concerned.

The programme approach encourages national execution of projects and promotes cooperation between partners at the country level. But the participation of the governmental authorities is dependent on the existence in the country of a macro-economic context, in other words, a multidisciplinary and multisectoral technical team responsible for advising the Government on the preparation of the programme within which projects financed by UNDP or other sources are to be incorporated. In fact, in many developing countries such bodies do not exist.

It is also apparent in some recipient countries that activities started and commitments entered into are systematically neglected with the departure of the officials who were their institutional instigators. This lack of respect by the State for its contractual commitments and the absence of continuity in its action are undeniable factors in poor NEX results. National staff assigned to projects by States are not always available because, for example, of their sudden transfer to other departments by the authorities of the country concerned.

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Through lack of regular consultation between the financing organizations and the specialized agencies, and lack of a clear and comprehensive view of the priorities of some recipient countries, UNDP, the agencies and donors do not always succeed in coordinating their participation in the programme of those countries or in avoiding mutual competition which is liable to jeopardize the coherence and effective execution of the project.

The total volume of projects executed by countries is growing steadily. However, since this growth is less apparent in some regions and countries than in others, the UNDP Representatives (primarily) in the former category of regions and countries should be invited to make greater efforts to explain the new approach in order to facilitate understanding by governmental authorities and persuade them to commit themselves in a more systematic, more relevant and more effective manner to the policy of national execution.

Some Governments exercise their full authority in the execution of their programme and the choice of implementing agents, while others take little interest in UNDP funds and instruct UNDP or other institutions in the United Nations system, in particular OPS, to handle the implementation of projects and the management of resources.

On the other hand, the countries interested in financial assistance from UNDP appreciate the new "national execution" method. They need the assistance of the specialized agencies in order to acquire the necessary technical and administrative competence for the execution of all their projects. 2/

The specialized agencies have extensive technical capacity accumulated over the years. They are capable of selecting and identifying experts and consultants in the country concerned and abroad. But in many cases, the following points have been noted:

(a) A lack of collaboration between the Resident Representative and the representatives of certain agencies: either the latter are not invited to discussions on the formulation of the country's framework-programme, or a particular agency is not invited by the Government or, in some cases, by the Resident Representative until after the project had been selected and evaluated in its absence;

(b) The specialized agencies have great facilities for access to information and to the international market on more advantageous terms than the Governments receiving assistance. In the recruitment of experts, for example, because of the security they afford, experts too prefer to be recruited by UNDP or a specialized agency rather than by Governments;

(c) While highlighting the importance of the efforts made in training nationals of the countries concerned, a careful examination of the programmes of United Nations institutions (UNDP, DDSMS, etc.) and the specialized agencies in this area reveals a certain imbalance. Most of these programmes are in fact geared to project management and intended for managers, and only rarely for the decision makers and senior staff called upon to identify priority sectors and to formulate and evaluate national projects.

Each institution, agency and department having its own budget and programme wants to organize its own training courses and its own workshops, a situation which reflects a lack of coordination between them. In the case of seminars on topics relating to specific technologies, such as telecommunication techniques and shipping, the organization of separate seminars is justified. But for all matters relating to management activities, i.e. the formulation of programmes, project evaluation, project funds management, international procurement and the recruitment of experts, it is important to centralize the resources intended for the financing of training activities and to use the services of the ILO International Training Centre in Turin.

3. Conclusion

The concept of national execution denotes both a method of execution of projects financed in the context of the United Nations and a development objective, an objective which is undoubtedly of the greatest importance for the whole of multilateral technical cooperation policy.

Although UNDP has to a certain extent rushed in the universal application of national execution of projects without really taking account of the technical and management capacities of the countries concerned, it would seem that national execution is gradually being accepted and supported by Governments and the specialized agencies. As a development objective, however, it still calls for much effort on the part of countries and, above all, the United Nations.

Since the fundamental objective of national execution is the building and strengthening of national capacities in the area of programming, evaluation, formulation and execution, its attainment depends largely and above all on the seriousness and effectiveness with which the system organizations play their principal role, which is to transfer to Governments the technology necessary for their self-development. In this area, the most urgent priority activities of these organizations continue to be the financing of special training in programming for senior staff and decision makers in the countries receiving assistance, and efforts to undertake modular training programmes on project management.

However, countries' responsibility for the attainment of the first objective of national execution is just as important as the action of the organizations in the United Nations system, since it is not sufficient for training programmes to be financed: the individuals trained must be effectively and rationally employed by their Governments in the execution of national projects, which unfortunately is still far from being the case. However, only if this condition is fulfilled will NEX cease to be viewed by donors as a bottomless pit - an operation without purpose or tangible results, and will NEX enable Governments to acquire an endogenous development capacity and to make substantial savings in project budgets through the use of national expertise.

Generally speaking, the training and effective use of nationals for project execution benefits both recipient countries and counterpart organizations. The countries acquire mastery of programming, formulation, execution and administrative management of projects, and of accounting and

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reporting. 3/ Moreover, this helps to reduce the numbers of missions to the countries concerned, experts and technical personnel of organizations formerly financed from project budgets. As to the organizations (UNDP, specialized agencies and donors), the savings achieved through the use of national expertise may enable them to finance other development programme-related activities in the various countries.

Notwithstanding the growing number of programmes and projects executed by countries, it is no exaggeration to say that in some respects national execution of projects has not so far produced the expected results. Whereas the new arrangements were intended, inter alia, to raise the level of technical support of the specialized agencies, misappreciation - by countries and by the agencies themselves - of the rules and procedures for the use of UNDP financial resources has in practice led to under-utilization of this technical support.

Thus, for example, an examination of UNDP expenditure during its fifth programming cycle shows that up to the end of 1993 resources effectively allocated to technical support services (TSS-1 and TSS-2) represented only US$ 13,831,000 out of a total of US$ 1,016,612,000, or 1.4 per cent of total UNDP expenditure during the period in question. It is true that this cycle is only in its second year, but this percentage is still a long way short of what, on average, it should have been if the proportion of resources allocated to technical support services is eventually to amount to at least 13 per cent of the old system. This fact alone proves, if such proof were necessary, that the new arrangements still need further detailed explanation to countries and specialized agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

In order to strengthen the partnership between Governments, UNDP and the specialized agencies at headquarters and country levels, it is important that:

(a) The Resident Representative should refer to the decisions and options contained in the framework-programme and seek the Government's agreement when formulating the national strategy note;

(b) When formulating the country framework-programme, member States that so desire should receive the technical opinions and advice of the specialized agencies, each of which has enormous experience in its sphere of competence;

(c) All the specialized agencies should participate in the formulation of the country framework-programme;

(d) The selection of agents responsible for implementing a project or a project element should be made transparently and in a spirit of genuine cooperation, after consultations between all the partners, in accordance with paragraph 32 of General Assembly resolution 42/196.

Recommendation 2

In order to help Governments to acquire the necessary capacity for identifying the country's real needs, selecting priority sectors, formulating framework-programmes, and coordinating external assistance together with the activities and inputs of the partners (UNDP, specialized agencies, donors), it is recommended that a special fund should be set up within UNDP to:

(a) Finance the training programmes organized by Governments or specialized agencies;

(b) Organize, for the benefit of senior staff and decision makers in member States, training seminars in the various countries, subregions and regions or at the International Training Centre in Turin (Italy); 4/

(c) Encourage the establishment of inter-agency teams responsible for counselling Governments on any question relating to the national execution of projects and coordinating the activities of all the United Nations system organizations in the various countries; 5/

(d) Promote, at the country level, the establishment of multidisciplinary and multisectoral teams comprising representatives of the various ministries, the private sector, NGOs and the scientific community. But it is important that the Government should set clear limits on their activities and ensure that they do not become parallel or competing bodies with the traditional governmental institutions.

Recommendation 3

The specialized agencies in the United Nations system should continue efforts to decentralize their technical services at the country or subregional levels and assign to these countries or subregions highly qualified personnel to train nationals, and transfer scientific and technical know-how.

Recommendation 4

The great number of rules and procedures relating to project management in force in UNDP and the specialized agencies constitute a big stumbling-block for Governments and system organizations alike. UNDP should therefore revise some of the procedures in its "Programme and Projects Manual" (PPM) so as to make them less complicated and thus facilitate the application of the new NEX method, particularly as regards successor arrangements. 6/ It should also encourage dissemination of the measures contained in the May 1992 report of the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) 7/ in the recipient countries.

In addition, UNDP, jointly with the specialized agencies, should:

(a) Formulate a definition - clear and acceptable to all - of national execution projects, in order to avoid varying interpretation according to the partners responsible for applying it;

(b) Establish clear regulations relating to the management of project funds and to the method of compensation and reimbursement of expenditure in favour of the specialized agencies (TSS-1 and TSS-2);

(c) Formulate, at the local level in consultation with the Government, clear systems:

(i) For the use of local resources and external inputs;

(ii) Relating to the determination of salaries and allowances to be paid to local personnel (national project directors and other specialized government personnel assigned to NEX projects and personnel recruited by the specialized agencies in their areas of competence), so as to avoid excessive discrepancies in salaries between the staff assigned to NEX projects.

INTRODUCTION

The context

1. The concept of national execution of projects by Governments (NEX) was introduced in the 1980s and has since made headway, giving rise to a practical policy. Statistics show that numbers of nationally executed projects and the volumes of funding devoted to them are increasing markedly (see tables 1-4, annex II).

2. The evolution of this new method of project execution since its inauguration in the 1980s reveals two significant developments: the undeniable growth in the number of government-executed projects, and the variations in NEX practices and results according to the region and/or country concerned.

3. Given the importance of this new method introduced by the General Assembly, the Director-General of FAO, in a letter dated 3 November 1989, suggested that the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) should carry out a study on "Government execution of UNDP-funded technical cooperation projects".

4. The General Assembly, in paragraph 13 of resolution 44/211 of 22 December 1989 relating to the "Comprehensive triennial policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system", again strongly recommended this method of project execution.

5. The UNDP Governing Council also took a number of decisions on the subject, notably decisions 90/21, 90/26 and 90/34, specifying action to be taken in order to give effect to the General Assembly's resolutions. In addition, the General Assembly, in paragraph 15 of resolution 47/199 of 22 December 1992, said that project execution by Governments should be the norm for programmes and projects supported by the United Nations system.

6. Although the proportion of government-executed projects is still relatively low (15 per cent on average) taking all regions together (see fig. 1, p. 14), it has nevertheless been increasing sharply in all regions, especially since 1991 (see table 1 and fig. 3, p. 16). Between 1988 and 1993, the government project/total project ratio grew almost threefold in Africa, more than fourfold in the countries of Asia and the Pacific, almost sixfold in the Arab countries, more than fivefold in the central and east European countries, and more than threefold in Latin America (see table 2 and fig. 4, p. 17; table 3 and fig. 5, p. 18).

7. At the same time, however, it is apparent that the situation varies considerably from one region to another. Thus, for example, government-executed projects account for 38 per cent of total projects in Latin America, 17 per cent in the Arab countries, 16 per cent in the countries of Asia and the Pacific, and 12 per cent in Europe. The proportion in Africa (11 per cent) remains the smallest (see fig. 2, p. 15).

8. It is apparent from these two findings that Governments and their partners are increasingly supportive of the NEX principle but do not yet share the same understanding of it. More specifically, the various players do not seem to have the same conception of their responsibilities and roles.

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Figure 1

TOTAL PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BETWEEN 1988 AND 1993

Distributed according to their method of execution
as a percentage of total projects



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Figure 2

PROJECTS EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS BETWEEN 1988 AND 1993

As a percentage of total projects financed by UNDP during the same period and in the same regions



Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

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Table 1

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP AND EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
AFRICA	91	119	138	172	289
ASIA AND PACIFIC	126	119	128	184	473
ARAB STATES	149	196	347	601	743
EUROPE	110	151	442	223	427
LATIN AMERICA	93	110	122	168	152

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study

Figure 3

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP AND EXECUTED BY GOVERNMENTS

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)



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Table 2

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BY YEAR AND BY REGION

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
AFRICA	110	125	132	106	108
ASIA AND PACIFIC	104	124	124	105	136
ARAB STATES	129	148	113	116	121
EUROPE	112	95	118	67	77
LATIN AMERICA	122	181	175	149	165

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

Figure 4

PROJECTS FINANCED BY UNDP BY YEAR AND BY REGION

By year and by region between 1988 and 1993 (1988 = base 100)



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Table 3

RATIO GOVERNMENT PROJECTS/TOTAL PROJECTS BY YEAR AND BY REGION

Between 1988 and 1993

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
AFRICA	8	7	8	8	13	23
ASIA AND PACIFIC	8	12	9	10	17	34
ARAB STATES	6	6	8	17	30	35
EUROPE	5	5	7	17	16	26
LATIN AMERICA	27	27	32	35	52	61

Calculated on the basis of the data in the Annual Budget Summary of the Programme Information Profile - Function 2 indicated in annex II to the present study.

Figure 5

RATIO GOVERNMENT PROJECTS/TOTAL PROJECTS BY YEAR AND BY REGION

Between 1988 and 1993



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9. In order to dispel the regrettable misunderstandings resulting from this situation, misunderstandings which undoubtedly jeopardize the harmonious functioning of the partnership - the foundation for the success of NEX - and the results expected from application of this method, the following two crucial questions should be cleared up once and for all:

(a) The responsibilities of Governments: their authority as executing agents for their programmes and projects, and their powers with regard to the selection of executing and implementing agents for projects;

(b) The role of each partner involved in the process of national project execution.

10. This is essentially the exercise attempted in the present study. At the same time, the study will take up the related but crucial problems of the training and building of national capacities which occupy a central position in the very concept of national execution. Obviously, this question, which extends beyond the scope of this study, will be dealt with only in passing, but it does appear to deserve a study in its own right.

The method

11. This study is essentially based on the analysis of replies to the questionnaire which was sent to the specialized agencies in the United Nations system and to a number of member States and UNDP. It has also made use of the findings of visits to a number of countries and to different departments within the United Nations secretariat and the specialized agencies, and talks with a number of coordinating Resident Representatives, and government and administration officials.

12. The study has been carried out in a number of stages, the first of which began in 1990-1991. After the initial research, which showed that national execution of projects was for many still an abstract innovation, the study had to be held up until the various players in the national execution of projects gained a clearer understanding of the NEX concept. The UNDP bureaux were in fact engaged in organizing explanatory seminars in a number of countries. Any evaluation of this new method of project execution would therefore have been premature.

13. Pursuant to a decision by the Governing Council of UNDP 8/ calling for an external independent evaluation of the new method, the Joint Inspection Unit decided to resume the study, as part of its work programme for 1994, and to prepare the present report.

14. For this reason, between December 1993 and March 1994 a number of units within the United Nations Secretariat (DDSMS, UNDP, OPS, TCDC, DGIP, UNICEF, UNFPA) and the specialized agencies 9/ were visited in order to learn about their experience with the national execution of projects. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the results of this activity were supplemented by an analysis of the NEX evaluation reports, particularly with regard to the Asian countries, and also of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, submitted to this year's session of ECOSOC, relating to United Nations operational activities in the area of international development cooperation.

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I. THEORY UNDERLYING THE NATIONAL EXECUTION OF PROJECTS (NEX)

A. The concept

15. The concept of the national execution of projects comprises a set of arrangements by which the entire responsibility for execution of their programmes and projects is transferred to developing countries. It is based on a combination of: 10/

(a) A number of new principles relating to the treatment of development programmes and projects, concerning property, execution and implementation;

(b) Readjustment of the respective roles of countries, UNDP and the specialized agencies, and of the relations between them in the context of a three-way partnership; and

(c) New mechanisms for financing specialized agency technical support for countries.

16. In accordance with the new UNDP "Guidelines", 11/ all programmes/projects are the property of countries, which direct and oversee them. On this basis, countries are responsible for the establishment of priorities, the attainment of the development objectives of programmes and projects, and the long-term viability of results. For the use of the funds advanced Governments are responsible to the Administrator of UNDP, who is himself responsible to the UNDP Governing Council, United Nations funds, donors and the other financing organizations. 12/

17. In the new programme and projects policy, the terms "execution" and "implementation" each have a specific meaning and can no longer be used as alternatives as in the past. "Execution" relates to the overall management of the programme/project and to the obligation to give an account of results, the attainment of programme/project objectives and the use of resources. "Implementation", on the other hand, is chiefly concerned with technical and administrative tasks, procuring and purchasing supplies, delivering components (equipment, facilities) needed for projects, recruiting experts, and managing projects financially and administratively.

18. The new method of financing draws a distinction between technical support services (TSS) and administrative and operational services (AOS), and creates two sets of TSS machinery: TSS-1, provided at the programme level, and TSS-2, provided at the project level. These two latter mechanisms apply only to five large agencies, 13/ while the essential components of the old system still apply to all the others. 14/

B. The approaches

19. The concept of national execution has not always been applied in all places with the same rigour. Slight variations, with considerable consequences, are apparent here and there, and reflect, in both countries and agencies, differences in approach to implementation of the concept. Thus, for example, it happens in some countries that a single ministry is designated as executing agent for a programme or project, whereas in others this function is entrusted to a number of national institutions possessing the specific

competence necessary for execution of the projects or certain project elements. In other cases, ad hoc national units are set up as focal points to perform the tasks relating to national execution or to advise the Government in that undertaking. 15/ And in some cases NGOs and private-sector institutions perform the role of executing agents. 16/

20. Sometimes specialized agencies such as FAO, WHO and UNIDO combine the functions of financing source and implementing agency, particularly in the case of projects not financed by UNDP. In these cases, they often entrust implementation tasks to national entities. For its part, UNFPA functions in some countries as a central purchasing organization for the projects it supports, leaving the central executing-agent tasks to the Government.

21. Implementation is sometimes entrusted to national agencies, such as autonomous institutions or organizations working in the field and possessing appropriate technical and administrative capacities. But in some cases the Government designates one or more specialized agencies in the United Nations system as implementing agents, in recognition of the specific nature of their work, their competence and the expertise they have available to them.

22. With regard to financial procedures for national execution, there are still significant differences in the practice of countries, specialized agencies and UNDP. Thus, for example, whereas UNDP makes quarterly advance payments, requiring an account of expenditure at the end of each quarter, UNICEF generally reimburses expenditure already effected.

23. This outline of differences in approach to implementation of the concept and policy of national execution of programmes and projects is not exhaustive, but it does give an indication of the imprecision in the concept and policy of NEX, which has been responsible for a certain amount of dysfunction that has jeopardized the attainment of its immediate and long-term objectives. The lines which follow endeavour to demonstrate this point.

C. Attempted synthesis

24. In order to take account of these disparities, paragraph 22 of resolution 47/199 requested the Secretary-General to promote agreement on a common interpretation of NEX. To this request the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ) responded by emphasizing that Governments are primarily responsible and accountable for the administration of their development programmes and projects, and that NEX must be the norm for programmes and projects financed by the United Nations system.

25. The common framework formulated by CCPOQ pays particular attention to the technical role to be played in NEX by the institutions in the United Nations system and encourages their involvement at the time of formulation and technical evaluation of country programmes, in other words, at the very outset of programming, in order to give senior national officials their technical opinions and advice. But this common interpretation sometimes causes practical problems of application, notably because of differences in the situation of countries and of specialized agencies in the United Nations system.

26. In fact, this interpretation rigidly systemizes the division of labour which, in its pure form, the concept of NEX establishes between the three categories of partners, namely, countries, specialized agencies and UNDP. However, if countries have to possess sufficient technical, administrative and managerial capacity to be able effectively to accept responsibility for execution of their programmes and projects, it goes without saying that NEX will not be applicable in countries lacking such capacity, unless they have the possibility of delegating that responsibility to organizations in the system. Furthermore, if the agencies are also to be involved in the whole NEX process, both upstream and downstream, it is imperative that their respective activities and fields of competence should be known in the countries or that they themselves should all be represented in the field. This is far from being the case, particularly with regard to the smaller agencies.

27. All in all, in so far as the concept of national execution of programmes and projects is intended to organize a three-way division of labour between the partners involved, it is clear that the roles of these partners and the relations between them constitute the keystone of national execution. It is vigorous observance of these two elements which lies at the basis of the correspondence of the concept with the policy (practice) of national execution and the effective attainment of its fundamental objective. It is also primarily at this level that a number of measures should be adopted to lessen, if not eliminate, the dysfunction which is currently casting a shadow on NEX performance.

II. NEX IN PRACTICE: THE ROLE OF THE PARTNERS AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM

A. Roles

28. The concept of national execution confers on each partner in the triad a specific mandate whose practical application imposes a number of conditions which define the role each plays in NEX.

Governments

29. The programmes/projects are all the property of the countries concerned, which direct them and oversee them. In this capacity they bear overall responsibility for managing the funds advanced by UNDP, drawing up their priorities, achieving the development objectives of their programmes and projects and ensuring the long-term viability of the results. In order to discharge this responsibility Governments must assess their own capacities in order to decide whether they can execute their programmes themselves or whether they should draw on outside expertise. 17/

30. These tasks call for high-level skills based on multidisciplinary knowledge that Governments must locate within themselves if they are to be in a position to fulfil their role efficiently and unaided. If they possess these skills they can legitimately - and should - execute all project phases themselves, from programming to final execution. If not, they must call upon an outside executing agent, thus bringing partnership into play. In addition, they must honour their commitment to UNDP by providing their financial and material counterpart contribution as a part of "GCCC" in good time so as to

prevent delays in project execution. They must also assign competent staff with enough education to quickly assimilate the rules of project management and administration.

31. Some countries have central, multidisciplinary technical units bringing together representatives of all public and private scientific and technical centres. The mandates of such units are to coordinate and analyse all national programmes and advise the Government on the decisions it should take. In such countries, the Governments know what they want and implementation measures are clear and are followed by all partners: UNDP, the agencies and other national or international institutions.

32. Given these conditions, would we not be justified in asking whether this does not mean in substance that if the countries concerned do not possess the required skills or the counterpart financial and material resources, they must shift the execution of their programmes to external agencies? As the prime objective of NEX is to help developing countries to progress, thanks to their own efforts, how can they move forward independently and control their own development process if they must constantly rely on agencies other than their own for the execution of their programmes/projects? Here, clearly, lies the risk of a vicious circle of underdevelopment.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

33. UNDP is the principal supplier of resources to developing countries and has the funds (IPFs, donors, and UNFPA and UNICEF programme funds) to finance programmes at Governments' requests. Within the context of national execution of programmes and projects, UNDP has a mandate to:

(a) Help Governments to secure the necessary capacity for project execution and management in an NEX setting; 18/

(b) Provide Governments with the various documents and other instructions needed (e.g. Guidelines on national execution of projects, documents on successor arrangements, etc.);

(c) Organize, in cooperation with other specialized agencies, seminars for political decision makers and national officials at the levels of project programming and formulation, project resources management, account-keeping and project administration. This is very important inasmuch as it enables all States to become truly involved in applying this new project execution technique, calling on other international institutions (specialized agencies and private sector institutions) only in sectors where they have as yet no capacity.

34. It also falls to UNDP to do everything possible to encourage countries to shoulder the responsibility for national execution of projects, as called for in General Assembly resolution 44/211 and other decisions by the UNDP Governing Council 19/ (90/34, 90/21 and 91/27). Lastly, UNDP and the other bodies in the system have a mandate to finance development activities in the developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs).

35. In the UNDP field offices, the Resident Representative plays an important role vis-à-vis the governmental authorities and national officials. He

supports the Government's efforts as regards the management of "IPF" funds and the execution of projects financed both by UNDP and by other lenders (specialized agencies and other donors, etc.). He helps the country's political leaders to shoulder their responsibilities in the execution of their projects. He also helps to arrange seminars and training workshops for national officials to strengthen the national capacities that Governments desire. Lastly, he provides information designed to facilitate the recruitment of experts, the use of funds and the maintenance of accounts, as well as mastery of the modalities of international procurement and the regulations governing them.

36. Clearly, then, the mandate of UNDP includes elements which enable it in principle to avoid the two-speed logic which is embryonic in NEX, as suggested previously. Yet in practice this power depends both on the specific situation in each country and on the rigour and efficiency with which UNDP staff, and particularly Resident Representatives in the developing countries, discharge their responsibilities. For the moment, it must be acknowledged that a marked imbalance persists in the ratio between NEX projects and total projects to the detriment of the regions that contain the largest numbers of LDCs (Africa) and the countries in transition in central and eastern Europe. 20/

The specialized agencies

37. The specialized agencies have a mandate to help member countries acquire the technical and managerial capacity to enable them to execute their programmes and projects themselves. Thus they should organize training courses, seminars and workshops, in member countries or outside, which would meet the totality of countries' needs for experts.

38. Under resolution 47/199, each specialized agency should, in its own field of activity, take measures to contribute to national capacity-building and training staff from recipient countries that so desire. They should also see to it that they assign technically competent staff to the requesting countries so as to respond rapidly and efficiently to requests for advice from the Governments concerned, but also so as to have contacts with the NGOs and national agencies operating in the field.

39. The consistency between the mandate entrusted to the specialized agencies and the objectives of national execution of programmes/projects is quite undeniable. However, in practice, because of the structural and financial difficulties facing the agencies, this consistency is in jeopardy in many cases, and with it the very effectiveness of their contribution to NEX.

40. Some specialized agencies are reluctant to become involved in operations for which they are not implementing agencies, sometimes because they wish to maintain the quality of their services, and also, no doubt, exclusive control over their technologies. When, in these circumstances, they participate in the execution of programmes and/or projects, they prefer to execute them using their own experts. But the most important and also the most relevant reasons are to be found elsewhere. At least two deserve mention.

41. First, it should be noted that, because the financial resources allocated for the acquisition, by project beneficiaries, of the technical support services (TSS-1 and 2) of the large agencies (ILO, UNESCO, FAO, UNIDO and

DTCD) must be supplemented using the agencies' regular budgets, they have difficulty in decentralizing their services to all countries both owing to a shortage of resources under their budgets and because of the decline in funds from UNDP.

42. Secondly, as the small agencies have no access to the TSS-1 and TSS-2 facilities, while at the same time they are hard hit by the financial crisis in the United Nations system, the problem as regards their representation in the field is even more acute than that facing the large agencies. Because they are often not represented in the country, their domains of activity are not included in the programmes of the countries concerned. This has a number of consequences for these agencies:

(a) Countries do not always succeed in identifying projects or project components which relate to their areas of competence and specialization;

(b) Their absence from the country when the country programme is drawn up favours the selection of sometimes inappropriate institutions to execute a project that falls within their terms of reference;

(c) Theoretically, they are represented in the country by the Resident Coordinator, who is supposed to advise the Government on any subject, including sometimes areas related to highly advanced technologies such as those dealt with by some of these small agencies. In order to perform such a function effectively, the resident coordinator should normally be a man (or a woman) of exceptional versatility and a wide range of comprehensive knowledge, which in human terms is not yet possible.

43. All things considered, it is by no means an exaggeration to state that effective and efficient participation by the specialized agencies in the three-sided partnership laid down in the concept of national execution of programmes and projects is not greatly in evidence. Additional steps which take into account the real difficulties faced by the agencies have yet to be taken in order to reduce the gap between the highly relevant concept of NEX and the policy to which it gives rise in practice.

B. Interrelations

Between Governments and UNDP

44. The relations pursued under the concept of national execution of programmes and/or projects between UNDP, Governments and specialized agencies are relations involving partnership, not assistance. This implies that each of the partners must discharge its responsibilities fully and responsibly, without exceeding or falling short on all or part of its mandate.

45. It is noteworthy that in some countries, owing to the alleged or real complexity of procedures and rules in both UNDP and other organizations in the United Nations system, the authorities prefer to forgo all responsibility and entrust to the UNDP representative the preparation and formulation of the programme and even sole responsibility for selecting the implementing agent for the projects. Hence the constant risk that a resident representative may usurp the role of the State. There have even been cases where resident representatives have substituted themselves for the State in its

responsibility for its programmes/projects, and for its representatives (ministers and chiefs of overseeing departments), and taken on the drafting of the country strategy note (CSN) in their place.

46. This note is normally prepared at the request of a Government, with the assistance of the organizations in the United Nations system and in cooperation with them, in order to lay down the priorities which must be supported using the resources of the United Nations system. The purpose of the CSN is to lay down a strategy accepted by all the partners, with a view to securing a consistent and coordinated response on the part of the United Nations system to the requirements of countries' plans, strategies and priorities. 21/

47. In other countries, UNDP has strengthened its offices, and they take on project implementation instead of officials of the country. The reason given is simply that the State has entrusted project management to the Resident Representative (or UNDP office) in order to prevent inappropriate use of project funds by its nationals as a result of their lack of experience.

48. Paragraph 1.4 (a) of PPM 30503 stipulates that: "When the executing agent for a UNDP-financed project is proposed to the Regional Bureau, the Resident Representative should ensure that the Government is designated as executing agent, even though the Resident Representative must ... ensure that the Government has the necessary competence to execute the project." Indeed, this raises a number of questions:

(a) The definition of the concept of national execution of projects, resolutions 44/211 and 47/199 and the various UNDP decisions and regulations lay down clearly that the Government is responsible for its programme and the execution of its projects;

(b) By virtue of the provisions of the UNDP "Guidelines", 22/ it is normally the Government that, with technical assistance from UNDP and in consultation with the specialized agencies, should assess its capacity with a view to the possible execution of its programme, and not the UNDP Resident Representative alone;

(c) On the basis of the provisions of article 1.4 (a) of the PPM already mentioned, we would be justified in asking whether the UNDP Resident Representative has, unaided, the multidisciplinary technical competence necessary to evaluate the capacity of the State and decide whether or not to designate it the executing agency.

49. Fortunately such cases are exceptions, but their very existence, combined with the ambiguity of article 14 (a) of the PPM, gives an idea of the risks involved in the application of NEX if steps are not taken to prevent both such an abdication of responsibility on the part of Governments and such encroachments by a number of resident representatives with somewhat over-enthusiastic personalities.

Between specialized agencies and UNDP

50. Details of execution and implementation are laid down at the time the programme or projects are designed, taking into account government policies,

factors specific to the country and the overall needs of each individual project. This process is carried out jointly by the Government, UNDP and the specialized agencies, so as to enable the Government to nominate executing and implementing agents for the programme or projects.

51. Cases have been encountered where specialized agencies had not been invited by the Government or even the Resident Representative of a country to execute one or more project elements until after it had been formulated, evaluated and approved. On other occasions a specialized agency will be approached when the agent in charge of implementation experiences technical difficulties, or when execution is delayed owing to the agent's incompetence. In such cases, some agencies have quite simply turned down such invitations; on the rare occasions when they have accepted, they have imposed strict conditions that preserve their credibility vis-à-vis the country and prevent them from getting involved in the execution of a poorly evaluated or under-evaluated project.

52. Thus it is important to emphasize that the harmonious and effective operation of NEX depends crucially on equitably involving all the specialized agencies ahead of the process of execution and implementation of country programmes and projects.

53. Taken together in their complexity, all these elements lead one to believe that, despite considerable efforts in conceptualizing the national execution of programmes and projects, and the generally positive and encouraging results already obtained, the proper and productive application of the concept of NEX still requires a number of links to be tightened, failing which the fundamental aim of NEX may never be fully attained.

54. Firstly, if the countries are to discharge properly the role assigned to them, it is vital that their decision makers and senior officials should have received adequate training in the programming and evaluation of their programmes as well as the management of the resources allocated for the execution of those programmes.

55. Along the same lines, it is important that they should make effective use of the staff trained in this way in order to avoid the indefinite repetition of this preliminary task, without which they will never gain control of the process, nor the unaided execution of their projects, nor, ultimately, their endogenous development. The option of delegating their responsibility to outside agencies should be regarded only as a supplementary option which is wholly temporary in nature and must absolutely be combined with training of national staff.

56. Secondly, the lack of effective coordination between the technical support services of the specialized agencies in the country tends in practice to replace the necessary mix of cooperation and development by the organizations of the United Nations system. This atmosphere of competition is harmful both to the development of the activities of the small agencies and to effective execution and implementation of programmes and projects.

57. Furthermore, inadequate coordination among all the partners in NEX at all stages, and particularly the stages which precede the process of national execution of projects, taken together with the shortage of financial resources

affecting certain agencies, leads to dysfunctional and counter-productive NEX. In that regard more rigorous coordination and relatively centralized management of all resources intended for operational technical cooperation activities could be envisaged as possible means of preventing the machinery for relations between NEX partners from seizing up.

Between specialized agencies and Governments

58. Informal inter-agency consultations were held in April 1994 among most of the United Nations organizations. These consultations offered the specialized agencies an opportunity to take stock of their activities within the framework of national execution of projects. At its most recent session, which has just ended, ECOSOC summed up the relations between the different participating agencies in documents E/1994/64, section II.D, and E/1994/64/Add.1, section IV.

59. The summaries in these reports do not emphasize any major difficulty in relations between specialized agencies and Governments. The only problem - not a small one - lies in the need to decentralize technical support services to ensure that countries receive the assistance they need in good time and in an appropriate manner.

60. UNFPA and ILO in particular have endeavoured to address this difficulty by setting up country support teams and multidisciplinary consultative teams respectively. In this regard the small agencies are particularly badly placed.

61. In the face of rapid technological change and short product cycles for new products, the developing countries experience considerable difficulty in promoting the competitiveness of their products. The specialized agencies in the United Nations system, particularly those like ITU and IAEA which operate in extremely advanced technical areas, should help them to acquire the new technologies at a cost which is competitive vis-à-vis market prices. This can only be achieved if there is an unhindered flow of information between the countries and agencies concerned.

III. DYSFUNCTION IN NEX:

Some examples

62. Field surveys and the various interviews on which this report is based have supplied a few illustrative examples of dysfunction in NEX, to which may be added other cases, not reported as such, that can be inferred from the wishes expressed by all the partners concerned.

A. Programming

63. Programming is an important phase in the process of national execution of projects. It comprises identification of priority sectors, project formulation and project evaluation. Yet this is the stage at which one most often finds either inadequate or inappropriately targeted training or a lack of cooperation between some resident representatives and organizations in the United Nations system, particularly the regional economic commissions and small specialized agencies.

64. Thus FAO would like UNDP to finance a special training programme for national programming capacity at the level of decision makers and senior officials; for it is at this level that some Governments, on encountering difficulties in fulfilling their role as executing agents for programmes and projects, often leave responsibility for them to UNDP representatives. This desire bears all the greater a resemblance to a criticism since it emanates from FAO, which usually contributes to a training programme in programme formulation and evaluation for its staff, both at headquarters and in the field, and trains national directors, coordinators and other officials, holding seminars and information sessions at its headquarters and the Turin Centre on its own resources.

65. As regards the lack of cooperation between certain UNDP staff and organizations in the United Nations system, it is important to mention that the regional economic commissions have never in practice been involved in this phase, still less in the overall process of national execution of projects, even though General Assembly resolution 32/197 of 20 December 1977 provides that they should help developing countries, at the request of interested Governments, in identifying projects and preparing programmes for the promotion of cooperation among countries. According to the resolution, the regional economic commissions are the main economic and social development centres within the United Nations system for their respective regions.

66. They should, taking into account the specific requirements and conditions in the countries in their regions, take on the role of team leaders and assume responsibility for coordination and cooperation at the regional level. They should also participate fully in the application of policies and the taking of decisions on programmes drawn up by entities within the system.

67. Another significant case of such lack of cooperation involved ITU in China. Under a Chinese project for which it was selected as implementing agent by the Government at the insistence of the UNDP Resident Representative, without having participated in project evaluation, it ran into many difficulties, including:

(a) The linguistic communication problem between the ITU experts, on the one hand, and the National Project Director and the other national staff on the other;

(b) Certain slow responses to ITU requests;

(c) The undervaluation of the project: as the sums allocated were clearly inadequate, recruiting even national experts was very difficult because their salaries were extremely small compared to the cost of living in their country. It was all the more out of the question to recruit high-quality experts on the international market who would accept such conditions. 23/

68. Certainly it is such experiences that underlie the insistence of ITU and ILO on the need to ensure that all specialized agencies are represented when the country's framework programme is prepared and formulated.

B. Implementation

69. The principal dysfunction in NEX as regards implementation relates to selection of the implementing agent for projects. In the cases which have been reported or noted in the field, the choice was often made after insufficient coordination among the partners; in any event such choices were not always made in a context of the greatest transparency.

70. Thus, for example, FAO points out that in Latin America the selection of an implementing agent is made by the Resident Representative without consulting the agencies. Hence frequent use is made of the services offered by OPS and the UNDP regional bureaux.

71. Under the aegis of the Government of India, UNIDO is involved in the execution of the National Leather Development Programme, financed by UNDP (IPF) to a total of US$ 15 million, and including 11 projects. The Government has set up a "Programme Management Committee" including appointees from the Government, UNDP, foreign private industry, local and federal industry and research and training institutes; but none of the agencies of the United Nations system is on the Committee, even though they have at the same time been invited to provide advice in line with their experience. UNIDO, FAO, ILO and other agencies have been selected by the Committee to implement various projects, and the advisers from the agencies are invited to important Committee meetings, but it is unclear what criteria govern their selection.

72. In Asia, ILO has a presence in 10 countries out of 26, as an implementing agency for NEX projects. It has encouraged the use of national project directors, for whom it has organized courses on project management methods. It reports a highly instructive example of a large country in the region in which national execution has been particularly difficult:

(a) The supervising ministry designated a national project director without taking account of the criteria in the project document;

(b) In many cases, a lack of cooperation has been observed between the UNDP Resident Representative and the government representative (National Project Director);

(c) Similarly, little sign has been seen of good cooperation between the technical project head and the National Project Director, the latter being a member of the national administration assigned to a project implemented by ILO.

73. UNESCO has participated in a number of NEX projects, including:

in Mozambique:

MOZ/82/004 - ARPAC (Archives of Cultural Heritage) in 1983-1987;

MOZ/89/021 - Training Support for Social Cultural Research and Documentation in 1990-1993

in Swaziland:

SWA/82/002 - Assistance to the National Museum (1983-1987)

in Uganda:

UGA/87/001: Rehabilitation of the National Museum

in Ethiopia:

ETH/86/008: Conservation of the historic town of Harar (1987-1991)

in Morocco:

MOR/90/003 - Southern casbahs rehabilitation centre (1991-1994).

74. UNESCO points out that in all these projects, as far as the choice of implementing agencies is concerned, the terms of article 2.2, paragraph 5 [Procedures of the UNDP modalities of project execution (Government execution) item 30503], which provides that a copy of the proposal by the Resident Representative should be sent to all the competent agencies, were not respected by any UNDP Resident Representative in the countries in question. However, in the case of project MOZ/89/021 a draft project document was sent to UNESCO for its comments and views.

75. Moreover, no appropriate arrangements were made to enable UNESCO to supervise these projects properly and provide technical support. In the case of project ETH/86/008, UNDP seems to have decided unilaterally to entrust project execution to the Government, following a request for US$ 250,000 by UNESCO for the budget of this project. In the case of project UGA/87/001, UNESCO was only invited to the tripartite evaluation of the preceding project, UGA/84/022, at the Saana Meeting, in November 1994.

C. Project management

76. There have been few reports of dysfunction in this area, aside from project MOR/90/003, for which UNESCO had to intervene directly, appointing a woman architect to deal with the operation and technical management of the Centre, since the junior Moroccan architects recruited were sorely lacking in experience.

77. In fact, project management is one of the components of national execution of projects to which the specialized agencies have made the greatest contribution, in particular through training of national management personnel, as is clear from the reports submitted by the agencies to the informal inter-agency consultations held in April 1994. 24/

IV. CONCLUSION

78. National execution of programmes and projects has incontestably become the norm for the execution of multilateral projects financed by organizations in the United Nations system. The number of projects executed in this way is growing, albeit with rather substantial differences between regions, but nevertheless growing steadily in all regions.

79. All the partners seem to have firmly adopted it, but noteworthy cases of dysfunction in its application still call for some adjustments, particularly as regards the roles and relationships of the various partners.

80. At the country level, there is a need to continue work both to explain the new procedures and rules of UNDP and the specialized agencies, and to train decision makers and senior staff, especially in programming and overall management, so as to enable governments to discharge their responsibilities as executing agents for their projects and thus steadily develop their national capacities.

81. Within UNDP, there is a need to promote regular and enhanced coordination between all the partners and their involvement at all levels of the process of national execution of projects, and to raise the degree of transparency in the choice of implementing agencies everywhere. It is also important that new financial arrangements for technical support services should be simplified, clarified and explained sufficiently clearly to prevent them from contributing in practice to reducing the use made of technical support from the specialized agencies, as is the case currently.

82. As regards the specialized agencies, they should make an effort to transfer constantly developing know-how and advanced technologies to the developing countries at affordable prices.

83. The lessons drawn from NEX are also valid for all development projects, whatever their sources of funding: bilateral funds and technical assistance financed by specialized agencies, the World Bank and multilateral sources such as UNDP, United Nations funds and others.

Notes

1/ Customs clearances, tax approvals, over-rigid national legislation, etc.

2/ JIU/REP/78/3.

3/ Resolution 44/211, para. 18 (b).

4/ Resolution 47/199, para. 43.

5/ Resolution 47/199, para. 40.

6/ The successor arrangements introduced in 1992.

7/ See General Business Guide for Potential Suppliers of Goods and Services to the United Nations System, Copenhagen, UNDP and IAPSO, May 1992.

8/ See, in particular, para. 9 of decision 93/25 of the Governing Council of UNDP.

9/ FAO, ILO, UNIDO, UNESCO (the so-called large agencies) and IAEA, IMO, ITU, UPU, WFP (the so-called small agencies).

10/ This concept was devised by UNDP and, before being applied to the activities of all the specialized agencies in the United Nations system with slight variations depending on the agency concerned, its implementation began in the context of the execution of programmes and projects financed by UNDP. For this reason, the elements used to define the concept in this study are those deriving from the UNDP guidelines.

11/ "Guidelines on determination of execution and implementation arrangements and successor arrangements for agency support costs", New York, UNDP, 1992 (draft).

12/ UNDP's Programme and Projects Manual 30503, para. 1.3.

13/ FAO, DTCD, ILO, UNIDO and UNESCO.

14/ With the exception of the Office for Project Services and the World Bank group, which are governed by a modified new system.

15/ See ECOSOC document E/1994/64 of 25 May 1994 entitled "Operational activities of the United Nations for international development cooperation", p. 15.

16/ Inter-Agency Informal Consultations on Programme Approach and National Execution, Turin, 28-30 April 1994, ILO International Training Centre. See p. 8 of the report.

17/ Resolution 47/199, of 22 December 1992 - Government Cash Counterpart Contribution (GCCC).

18/ See PPM 30503 (e) 1: Assistance to Governments to enhance their execution capability.

19/ See UNDP Governing Council decisions 90/21, 91/27 and 90/34.

20/ See table 3 and figure 5 on page 17.

21/ See resolution 47/199, para. 9 (b), (c) and (d).

22/ Op. cit., p. 6, para. 2.2.1.

23/ For example, allocation for a 15-day contract in China, US$ 6,000; travel costs, US$ 4,000; balance remaining, US$ 2,000 (15 per cent per diem, 85 per cent salary), or US$ 1,700 for 15 days' salary.

24/ See ECOSOC documents E/1994/64, section II.D, and E/1994/64/Add.1, section IV.

Annexes I and II

Abbreviations for budget items

PER	Personnel
SUB	Subcontracting
TRN	Training
EQP	Equipment
MSC	Miscellaneous
SUP	Support costs
099	Grand total
CSH	Cost-sharing
999	NET TOTAL

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Annex I

PROGRAMME INFORMATION PROFILE - FUNCTION 2

ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY - BUDGETS BY REGION

AFRICA

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	168 285 677	195 832 164	230 604 680	258 064 935	223 033 706	208 733 167	1 284 554 329
SUB	31 453 663	34 084 479	40 943 334	39 335 447	33 599 541	40 231 186	219 647 650
TRN	35 671 827	42 729 742	48 978 731	52 950 701	42 287 441	53 569 914	276 188 356
EQP	75 123 579	64 937 953	66 653 144	55 490 044	42 396 533	49 901 651	354 502 904
MSC	26 103 163	27 704 573	31 114 042	36 187 103	31 816 883	29 476 167	182 401 931
SUP	2 147 457	1 574 230	1 265 128	923 087	869 577	426 497	7 205 976
099	338 785 366	366 863 141	419 559 059	442 951 317	374 003 681	382 338 582	2 324 501 146
CSH	-19 430 321	-15 265 825	-18 945 778	-22 858 309	-32 343 946	-38 507 328	-147 351 507
999	319 355 045	351 597 316	400 613 281	420 093 008	341 659 735	343 831 254	177 149 639
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 4 219							

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	96 125 531	105 141 473	121 034 157	137 307 432	126 114 963	154 228 767	739 952 323
SUB	48 424 346	54 896 948	66 577 352	65 919 579	61 026 521	77 031 337	373 876 083
TRN	50 591 861	54 818 046	60 347 377	57 053 294	47 584 902	66 621 155	337 016 635
EQP	75 964 898	65 695 968	87 204 059	76 999 845	57 376 498	85 591 421	448 832 689
MSC	8 347 738	8 665 910	10 730 341	10 231 210	10 320 473	13 043 862	61 339 534
SUP	372 542	646 083	725 648	316 807	284 916	58 175	2 404 171
099	279 826 916	289 864 428	346 618 934	347 828 167	302 708 273	396 574 717	1 963 421 435
CSH	-20 250 898	-19 537 623	-22 814 199	-26 302 452	-26 222 117	-41 633 273	-156 760 562
999	259 576 018	270 326 805	323 804 735	321 525 715	276 486 156	354 941 444	1 806 660 873
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 846							

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ARAB STATES							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	36 171 279	44 162 613	50 893 071	46 772 244	43 241 697	51 894 739	273 135 643
SUB	6 163 305	9 843 639	15 998 025	14 288 457	15 737 573	19 825 847	81 856 846
TRN	7 549 277	10 120 788	12 685 653	9 111 241	8 064 346	11 783 322	59 314 627
EQP	20 541 452	20 961 764	21 684 170	18 073 369	16 922 206	15 413 286	113 596 247
MSC	2 304 240	4 093 684	3 996 371	5 308 170	4 671 704	6 467 751	26 841 920
SUP	259 893	322 609	424 493	174 548	106 702	23 260	1 311 505
099	72 989 446	89 505 097	105 681 783	93 728 029	88 744 228	105 408 205	556 056 788
CSH	-16 293 549	-16 334 632	-21 833 921	-29 628 455	-23 002 372	-36 927 675	-144 020 604
999	56 695 897	73 170 465	83 847 862	64 099 574	65 741 856	68 480 530	412 036 184
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 1 392							

EUROPE							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	3 920 752	3 911 946	3 727 206	6 754 975	4 656 018	6 010 339	28 981 236
SUB	731 029	1 372 552	1 179 823	2 164 151	513 675	1 697 595	7 658 825
TRN	3 568 714	3 788 657	4 755 442	4 706 630	2 179 206	2 587 969	21 586 618
EQP	5 462 461	7 029 908	4 536 798	4 720 807	2 284 303	4 758 068	28 792 345
MSC	364 964	338 460	462 588	521 097	332 308	480 474	2 499 891
SUP	8 486	-530	8 789	11 190	0	0	27 935
099	14 056 406	16 440 993	14 670 646	18 878 850	9 965 510	15 534 445	89 546 850
CSH	-563 831	-1 296 612	-1 758 693	-2 865 985	-925 048	-5 169 012	-12 579 181
999	13 492 575	15 144 381	12 911 953	16 012 865	9 040 462	10 365 433	76 967 669
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 586							

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LATIN AMERICA							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	70 682 459	76 084 928	84 903 399	103 118 411	129 504 548	211 153 031	675 446 776
SUB	11 458 701	13 459 952	14 705 364	23 827 537	46 290 903	137 797 250	247 539 707
TRN	11 534 747	11 006 848	11 753 488	12 502 389	13 746 810	38 345 201	98 889 483
EQP	33 579 179	29 973 933	29 934 442	39 375 008	48 238 985	92 895 527	273 997 074
MSC	6 377 963	6 556 056	7 544 720	15 527 416	14 445 785	24 685 117	75 137 057
SUP	181 361	144 457	47 427	1 683	0	0	374 928
099	133 814 410	137 226 174	148 888 840	194 352 444	252 227 031	504 876 126	1 371 385 025
CSH	-47 518 236	-56 756 142	-68 543 668	114 069 004	-175 870 396	-446 036 229	-908 793 675
999	86 296 174	80 470 032	80 345 172	80 283 440	76 356 635	58 839 897	462 591 350
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 022							

INTERREGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROJECTS - GRAND TOTAL							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	19 113 044	24 923 533	31 114 994	33 854 696	27 260 812	30 966 014	167 233 093
SUB	23 243 040	22 236 745	35 342 794	42 095 466	34 272 521	41 675 684	198 866 250
TRN	3 621 274	5 093 219	4 880 330	2 995 777	5 107 280	5 200 362	26 898 242
EQP	2 452 040	3 077 125	4 053 363	6 165 641	3 988 750	3 751 210	23 488 129
MSC	1 849 909	1 540 085	2 386 272	2 466 278	1 981 271	1 969 058	12 192 873
SUP	662 084	824 053	1 122 682	657 133	460 419	483 504	4 209 875
099	50 941 391	57 694 760	78 900 435	88 234 991	73 071 053	84 045 832	432 888 462
CSH	-10 847 313	-8 748 912	-6 258 317	-17 753 606	-13 232 557	-17 643 240	-74 483 945
999	40 094 078	48 945 848	72 642 118	70 481 385	59 838 496	66 402 592	358 404 517
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3 712							

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GRAND TOTAL							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	394 298 742	450 056 657	522 277 507	585 872 693	553 811 744	662 986 057	3 169 303 400
SUB	121 474 084	135 894 315	174 746 692	187 630 637	191 440 734	318 258 899	1 129 445 361
TRN	112 537 700	127 557 300	143 401 021	139 320 032	118 969 985	178 107 923	819 893 961
EQP	213 123 609	191 676 651	214 065 976	200 824 714	171 207 275	252 311 163	1 243 209 388
MSC	45 347 977	48 898 768	56 234 334	70 241 274	63 568 424	76 122 429	360 413 206
SUP	3 631 823	3 510 902	3 594 167	2 084 448	1 721 614	991 436	15 534 390
099	890 413 935	957 594 593	1 114 319 697	1 185 973 798	1 100 719 776	1 488 777 907	6 737 799 706
CSH	-114 904 148	-117 939 746	-140 154 576	-213 477 811	-271 596 436	-585 916 757	1 443 989 474
999	775 509 787	839 654 847	974 165 121	972 495 987	829 123 340	902 861 150	5 293 810 232
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 13 755							

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Annex II

PROGRAMME INFORMATION PROFILE - FUNCTION 2

ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY - FOR GOVERNMENT BY REGION

GVT AFRICA

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	8 287 282	8 944 200	12 588 188	14 931 205	20 428 241	38 334 876	103 513 992
SUB	4 516 178	2 599 161	2 971 814	5 474 754	8 312 403	15 850 712	39 725 022
TRN	4 938 063	4 531 486	5 682 508	6 376 410	7 765 498	12 644 851	41 938 816
EQP	8 676 347	6 299 183	9 332 882	6 860 227	7 579 691	15 286 209	54 034 539
MSC	2 780 840	3 924 063	3 714 951	4 368 751	4 748 779	4 477 871	24 015 255
SUP	49 984	121 445	224 796	313 558	297 640	139 100	1 146 523
199	29 248 694	26 419 538	34 515 139	38 324 905	49 132 252	86 733 619	264 374 147
CSH	-2 160 099	-1 745 404	-2 368 228	-939 423	-2 657 830	-8 433 262	-18 304 246
999	27 088 595	24 674 134	32 146 911	37 385 482	46 474 422	78 300 357	246 069 901

NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 613

GVT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	7 178 773	8 470 632	8 565 025	10 225 483	15 460 935	38 314 549	88 215 397
SUB	4 524 875	8 248 024	7 918 410	7 012 864	14 631 905	23 974 027	66 310 105
TRN	6 492 705	8 035 608	10 078 721	9 664 209	11 288 797	28 111 883	73 671 923
EQP	10 205 136	11 567 230	14 211 421	18 654 653	14 577 316	48 839 778	118 055 534
MSC	534 734	969 696	771 357	921 134	1 357 940	3 841 752	8 396 613
SUP	54 798	101 933	2 075	4 525	2 000	0	165 331
099	28 991 021	37 393 123	41 547 009	46 482 868	57 318 893	143 081 989	354 814 903
CSH	-2 971 620	-4 621 824	-10 569 542	-13 050 748	-9 356 609	-19 886 137	-60 456 480
999	26 019 401	32 771 299	30 977 467	33 432 120	47 962 284	123 195 852	294 358 423

NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 767

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GVT ARAB STATES							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	974 368	1 051 395	1 886 570	3 956 478	6 741 208	13 127 447	27 737 466
SUB	511 817	1 390 076	1 921 741	3 262 113	4 675 464	6 282 313	18 043 524
TRN	674 255	1 036 777	1 177 058	1 102 863	1 618 702	3 122 696	8 732 351
EQP	1 360 582	1 959 401	2 151 628	3 502 511	7 367 065	6 580 998	22 922 185
MSC	173 363	158 745	323 811	939 164	1 233 429	2 923 176	5 751 688
SUP	1 239	68 580	9 905	12 746	57 519	8 920	158 909
099	3 695 624	5 664 974	7 470 713	12 775 875	21 693 387	32 045 550	83 346 123
CSH	-448 258	-1 109 909	-1 103 883	-1 522 602	-2 149 892	-7 905 723	-14 240 267
999	3 247 366	4 555 065	6 366 830	11 253 273	19 543 495	24 139 827	69 105 856
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 183							

GVT EUROPE							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	35 580	123 293	119 710	1 845 165	724 497	1 281 059	4 129 304
SUB	47 636	94 500	28 763	214 463	149 528	645 024	1 179 914
TRN	150 604	157 441	247 709	607 331	162 184	601 970	1 927 239
EQP	391 503	465 835	727 525	1 218 197	509 471	1 654 844	4 967 375
MSC	14 660	6 352	19 322	52 724	22 068	131 995	247 121
SUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
099	639 983	847 421	1 143 029	3 937 880	1 567 748	4 314 892	12 450 953
CSH	0	-140 290	-178 898	-1 111 010	-143 296	-1 582 058	-3 155 552
999	639 983	707 131	964 131	2 826 870	1 424 452	2 732 834	9 295 401
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 77							

GVT LATIN AMERICA							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	22 167 576	24 845 667	30 261 600	47 205 032	76 141 436	157 794 184	358 415 495
SUB	4 722 112	6 828 563	7 636 740	9 677 288	26 096 888	113 892 273	168 853 864
TRN	4 209 381	3 771 280	4 876 608	4 938 230	7 561 304	30 157 189	55 513 992
EQP	12 623 172	11 199 520	13 914 007	17 993 716	29 370 934	77 358 582	162 459 931
MSC	2 529 124	1 943 568	2 935 641	6 204 117	7 058 226	20 074 381	40 745 057
SUP	2 991	68 984	161	0	0	0	72 136
099	46 254 356	48 657 582	59 624 757	86 018 383	146 228 788	399 276 609	786 060 475
CSH	-22 738 041	-26 753 689	-33 805 440	-57 272 354	-106 639 186	-363 545 054	-610 753 764
999	23 516 315	21 903 893	25 819 317	28 746 029	39 589 602	35 731 555	175 306 711
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 1 298							

GVT INTERREGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROJECTS							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	109 416	215 599	160 512	199 217	119 800	0	804 544
SUB	51 185	0	0	30 600	20 400	0	102 185
TRN	0	0	34 000	26 000	0	0	60 000
EQP	80 720	116 950	10 000	0	0	0	207 670
MSC	7 596	10 500	11 500	11 200	5 000	0	45 796
SUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
099	248 917	343 049	216 012	267 017	145 200	0	1 220 195
CSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
999	248 917	343 049	216 012	267 017	145 200	0	1 220 195

GVT GRAND TOTAL							
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTAL
PER	38 752 995	43 650 786	53 581 605	78 362 580	119 616 117	248 852 115	582 816 198
SUB	14 373 803	19 160 324	20 477 468	25 672 082	53 886 588	160 644 349	294 214 614
TRN	16 465 008	17 532 592	22 096 604	22 715 043	28 396 485	74 638 589	181 844 321
EQP	33 337 460	31 608 119	40 347 463	48 229 304	59 404 477	149 720 411	362 647 234
MSC	6 040 317	7 012 924	7 776 582	12 497 090	14 425 442	31 449 175	79 201 530
SUP	109 012	360 942	236 937	330 829	357 159	148 020	1 542 899
099	109 078 595	119 325 687	144 516 659	187 806 928	276 086 268	665 452 659	1 502 266 796
CSH	-28 318 018	-34 371 116	-48 025 991	-73 896 137	-120 946 813	-401 352 234	-706 910 309
999	80 760 577	84 954 571	96 490 668	113 910 791	155 139 455	264 100 425	795 356 487
NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 2 950							